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insurance. This paper discusses the pros and cons of pre-
mium differentiation, first in disability insurance and then
in unemployment insurance.
Disability Schemes
In 1992, about 7% of the Dutch population between the age
of 15 and 64 collected disability benefits. This rate is more
than twice the rate in other European countries. The high
disability rate in the Netherlands is sometimes referred to
as the ‘Dutch disease.’ The Dutch disease can be explained
by the disability scheme involving a large share of so-called
hidden unemployment, i.e. people who are able to work but
nevertheless occupy disability schemes. Indeed, a parlia-
mentary committee in 1991 concluded that both employ-
ers and employees had abused the relatively generous and
open-ended disability scheme as an exit route for residual
workers. Empirical research confirms this conclusion. It
suggests that during the last two decades about half of the
people assigned a disability benefit are actually able to work
(see e.g. Aarts and De Jong, 1990 and Westerhout, 1996).
Initial measures
In response to the expansion of disability coverage, the
Dutch government reformed disability schemes in several
ways. Between 1985 and 1987, the statutory benefit rate
was cut from 80% to 70% of final pay. In 1993, the legal
definition of the appropriate job for disabled was widened
and benefits for new claimants were reduced further by
making it age-dependent. Furthermore, a program of reas-
sessments of the current beneficiaries was started in 1994
in order to select those who are able to work. As a result of
these measures, the net inflow into the disability scheme
became negative in 1994 and 1995. In the second half of
1996, however, the inflow turned positive again.
Premium differentiation
The current public disability scheme charges a uniform
premium, making the system vulnerable to moral hazard.
Employers do not internalize the social consequences of be-
havior that increases disability risk: society, rather than the
firm, bears the burden of financing the disability benefits.
In 1998, a new system has been introduced in disability
insurance. The new public system involves experience rat-
ing. In particular, the public premiums charged to each firm
are based on the benefits paid to disabled workers of the
firm during the first five years of the disability claims. Em-
ployers can opt out of this public system by either taking out
private insurance or taking financial responsibility of statu-
tory disability benefits themselves. The public system con-
tinues to apply to all disability claims beyond the fifth year
of disability.
Benefits of competition
The new system has two primary aims. The first objective
is to confront employers with the costs and benefits of their
behavior. Indeed, competition ensures that premiums
Introduction
By the early eighties, the number of inactive people relying
on social benefits in the Netherlands had become so large
that reform of the generous social security system was
called for (see Don and Besseling, 1996). Reforms in the mid
eighties were aimed primarily at fighting moral hazard of
workers and benefit recipients by reducing benefit levels.
These measures, however, did not suffice. In the nineties,
social insurance was reformed more fundamentally. Be-
sides tightening eligibility conditions for disability and
unemployment benefits, reforms affected the behavior of
employers and benefit administrations. While the employer
is still legally required to pay 70% of the wage of a sick
employee, the public sickness insurance scheme was priva-
tized in 1996. In the disability scheme, employers have the
option to insure disability risks with a private insurer rather
than with the public system since the beginning of 1998.
The resulting competition between private companies and
public agencies is accompanied by premium differentia-
tion. An important question is whether premium differen-
tiation should be introduced also in unemployment
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Abstract
Premium differentiation in disability insurance encour-
ages employers to improve working conditions in order
to combat disability. Furthermore, by introducing com-
petition in disability insurance,  the implementation and
administration of the insurance becomes more efficient.
This advantage does not apply to premium differentia-
tion in unemployment schemes because the unemploy-
ment risk, which is correlated among firms, cannot be
insured by private companies. Premium differentiation
may even have unfavorable consequences by raising
unemployment duration.
Samenvatting
Premiedifferentiatie in de WAO stimuleert bedrijven de
arbeidsomstandigheden te verbeteren om zodoende
arbeidsongeschiktheid te voorkomen. Bovendien
verbetert het middels marktwerking de doelmatigheid
van de uitvoering. Bij de WW speelt dit laatste voordeel
minder omdat het werkloosheidsrisico, als afhankelijk
risico, niet op de particuliere markt verzekerbaar is.
Premiedifferentiatie in de WW kan zelfs ongewenste
effecten oproepen, omdat het de werkloosheidsduur kan
doen toenemen.
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closely match actuarial risks; they can no longer shift the
costs of their behavior onto a collective pool. Hence, em-
ployers are encouraged to reduce disability risks by improv-
ing working conditions and by cutting extra-statutory
benefits. Cutting disability risks reduces not only the pre-
mium for the extra-statutory insurance, which at present
are already differentiated across firms, but also the pre-
mium for the statutory benefits.
Second, competition is likely to improve the efficiency
of the implementation and administration of the insurance.
Employers, private insurers and public administrators face
more incentives to return the disabled back to work. Moral
hazard is likely to be reduced as competition yields infor-
mation about cost levels in benefit administration. Organi-
zations that are most successful in preventing disability and
encouraging revalidation and reintegration can exploit this
as a comparative advantage. Moreover, through legal pro-
cedures, private insurers can ensure that disability assess-
ments by the public gatekeepers do not become too lax.
By introducing incentives in both the sickness and dis-
ability schemes, the employer is responsible for combat-
ting both sickness and disability. Hence, the difference
between the sickness scheme, which has been privatized,
and the disability scheme, which used to be financed na-
tionally, disappeared. Employers thus also face incentives
to revalidate workers that have been sick for almost one
year.1
Another advantage of the new system is that it removes
cross subsidization from low-risk firms towards high-risk
firms. This enhances the efficient allocation of goods and
factors. Furthermore, the new system raises the effective
supply of labor because hidden unemployed in disability
schemes typically search less effectively for a job than do
other unemployed. This leads to downward wage pressure,
thereby stimulating job creation.
Drawbacks of competition
The advantages of competition in disability insurance in
terms of improved efficiency and decreased moral hazard
should be traded off against less solidarity and possible
adverse selection problems. In particular, in reducing their
premium levels, employers may try to select good risks,
thereby reducing the access of vulnerable groups to the
labor market. Furthermore, these attempts of employers to
uncover the good risks may increase search and transac-
tion costs on the labor market.
To alleviate these potential problems, the government
has taken several measures. First, a separate insurance for
early handicapped has been introduced. Second, to
strengthen the labor-market position of people with health
problems, employers who hire employees with weak health
may receive a special budget. Third, insurance premiums
do not differentiate across individual workers but apply to
the pool of workers in any firm. Hence, risks are pooled
across all employees within a firm. Especially in large firms,
improving working conditions is a much more effective
method to reduce the prospective number of disabled and
thus the premiums than selecting employees on the basis
of health conditions. Fourth, premiums for the public
scheme applying to the first five years of disability are
subject to a maximum. This maximum is lower for small
firms. In this way, the new system tries to prevent small
firms from selecting workers on the basis of their health
condition.
Unemployment schemes
Also unemployment insurance suffers from moral hazard.
The new disability scheme makes disability less attractive
as an exit route for older workers. Therefore, employers
may increasingly use unemployment schemes as an alter-
native route for the disability scheme to get rid of their older
workers. The older workers are often willing to accept this
early-retirement offer, especially because in the Nether-
lands they do not have to apply for another job if they are
older than 57 1/2 years. Also the increased flexibility of the
labor market, including the growing importance of flexible
contracts, increases the risks that flexible workers and
employers that regularly fire and hire flexible workers abuse
unemployment insurance; these firms and workers do not
internalize the social costs of temporary unemployment.
Experience rating in unemployment schemes
In the Netherlands, unemployment benefits are largely fi-
nanced out of public premiums that are uniform across
firms.2 Hence, the social costs of unemployment are not
internalized in the behavior of firms that fire workers. In this
respect, it seems attractive to differentiate unemployment
premiums across firms on the basis of experience rating
(see below). Thus, differentiated premium levels should re-
flect the different unemployment risks of firms. Firms that
tend to lay off a large number of workers are confronted
with a higher premium, while firms featuring a lower lay-
off rate face a lower premium. Firms are thus encouraged
to avoid dismissals so that the flow into unemployment
falls. Instead of firing employees, employers may find it in-
creasingly attractive to invest in their workers.
Box 1 Premium differentiation
in disability schemes
Advantages
* Firms are encouraged to combat disability, e.g. by im-
proving working conditions.
* Competition improves the efficiency of the administra-
tion of disability insurance.
* The new system provides the incentive to revalidate
people who have been on sick leave for a long time.
* Less cross-subsidies from low-risk firms towards high-
risk firms improves the efficient allocation of goods and
factors.
* More effective labor supply reduces wage pressure and
stimulates job creation.
Disadvantage
* Competition encourages firms to select good risks. This
reduces solidarity between good risks and vulnerable
groups.98/1
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Another advantage of experience rating is that it reduces
implicit cross-subsidies among sectors in the economy. In
particular, during peak seasons, some sectors rely heavily
on flexible workers, who are unemployed during the rest
of the year. The present system only partially differentiates
premiums across sectors. Hence, the prices of goods pro-
duced by sectors relying heavily on flexible labor do not
fully reflect the social costs of this labor. Experience rating
would enhance the efficient allocation of resources across
sectors by raising the costs of employing flexible workers.
Drawbacks of experience rating
For several reasons, experience rating in unemployment
insurance seems less attractive than competition in disabil-
ity insurance. First, in contrast to disability, unemployment
cannot be insured by private companies. This is because
unemployment risk is correlated across firms since it de-
pends to a large extent on common external factors, such
as the business cycle. These circumstances affect all firms
in a similar way.
Since the unemployment risk cannot be insured by pri-
vate insurers, premium differentiation in unemployment
insurance does not yield the increased efficiency of benefit
administration that is associated with competition between
public and private insurers in disability insurance. More-
over, one cannot rely on competition among private insur-
ers to determine firm-specific premiums that are actuarially
fair. Therefore, premium differentiation can be imple-
mented only in a bureaucratic way by a public agency on
the basis of experience rating. With experience rating, firms
pay for the unemployment benefits that they have caused
in previous years. In fact, they become the insurers of their
own unemployment risk. This puts a heavy burden on
firms. This is especially so because they cannot affect the
part of the unemployment risk that is due to the business
cycle. This part of the risk tends to be correlated across
workers so that the firms cannot benefit from the law of
large numbers. This is in contrast to the part of the disabil-
ity risk that they cannot affect, which is not correlated across
workers. As a result of this rather heavy burden of unem-
ployment risk, firms may well become more reluctant to
hire new employees because of the additional financial
unemployment risk associated with a marginal worker.
Through this channel, experience rating in unemployment
schemes hampers the flow out of unemployment schemes.
As a direct consequence, unemployment duration in-
creases (see also  Mortensen and Millard, 1996, or Albrecht
and Vroman, 1996).3 For European economies, this is an
important disadvantage in light of the social and economic
problems associated with the high level of structural, long-
term, unemployment. Several labor-market programs are
aimed at fighting long-term unemployment. Experience
rating further increases the pressure on these programs.
Experience rating also reduces solidarity between work-
ers with different unemployment risks because it encour-
ages firms to select workers with low unemployment risks.
In particular, firms may increasingly use the long-term un-
employment status as a signal of a high unemployment
risk. In this way, the labor-market position of the long-term
unemployed is worsened.
Finally, experience rating induces upward wage pres-
sure by strengthening the position of workers (see also
Mortensen and Millard, 1996). In particular, the bargaining
position of employers in wage negotiations depends on the
threat of firing employees. This threat becomes less cred-
ible because employers face higher costs if they fire work-
ers. The improved bargaining position of workers (the
insiders) drives up wage claims. This hurts the unem-
ployed, who see their access to work reduced. More gen-
erally, experience rating enhances the position of existing
workers (who are less likely to lose their jobs), but weakens
the position of the unemployed (who are less likely to find
a job). The reduced access of the unemployed to work dis-
courages the unemployed from actively searching for work.
The reduction in effective labor supply induces additional
wage pressure, thereby reducing employment.
US evidence
In the US, limited experience rating in unemployment
schemes is common practice. The system was introduced
in the late thirties because firms abused the publicly fi-
nanced unemployment schemes for temporary lay-offs, i.e.
they hired workers during the peak season and fired them
during other periods. The exact implementation of experi-
ence rating differs among the various states but all states
impose minimum and maximum premium levels on the
premiums charged. On average, about 50% of the unem-
ployment benefits in the US is subject to experience rating.
US evidence suggests that experience rating is a prom-
ising instrument for reducing unemployment. Card and
Levine (1994), for example, estimate that temporary layoff
unemployment could drop by about 50% if unemployment
Box 2 Premium differentiation
in unemployment schemes
Advantages
* Firms are encouraged to reduce job lay-offs and to
not use unemployment insurance as an early retire-
ment scheme.
* Less cross-subsidies from low-risk firms towards
high-risk firms improves the efficient allocation of
goods and factors.
* Firms are stimulated to invest in firm-specific human
capital.
Disadvantages
* Firms become more reluctant to hire new employ-
ees because they bear the risk of unemployment
themselves. The reduced access of the unemployed to
work raises unemployment duration.
* Firms select good risks. This increases search and
transaction costs and worsens the labor-market posi-
tion of vulnerable groups, such as the long-term
unemployed.
* The stronger position of workers induces higher
wages and lower employment.22
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schemes would be based on full experience rating, rather
than the incomplete experience rating as currently in place
in the US. The effect on overall unemployment is smaller
but still significantly negative. Also other empirical studies
find that experience rating reduces unemployment in the
US (see e.g. Topel, 1983; Anderson and Meyer, 1994; and
Hamermesh, 1993).
US versus Europe
Experience rating in unemployment schemes is probably
less effective in most European countries than in the US.
One important reason is that employment protection in
Europe tends to be tighter than it is in the US. In most
European countries, firing employees involves a costly
legal process and high administrative costs for employers.
Experience rating would further increase employment
protection. Given low employment protection in the US,
experience rating in unemployment insurance may be
attractive because it induces firms to invest more in firm-
specific human capital of their employees. In Europe,
however, additional firing costs may be counterproductive
because they come on top of the strict rules already
imposed.
The difference in employment protection is one of the
reasons why long-term unemployment is much lower in
the US. The much smaller incidence of long-term unem-
ployment in the US indicates that the unemployed have
better access to the labor market than do their counterparts
in Europe. Hence, the negative effect of experience rating
on the outflow of unemployment insurance on jobs is less
serious in the US than it is in Europe.
Another major difference between the US and Europe
is that the level of unemployment benefits is higher and the
duration of unemployment benefits is longer in Europe. On
the one hand, this implies that experience rating induces
more incentives to avoid job layoff. On the other hand, the
negative effects of experience rating that were identified
above will become larger. Furthermore, it may seem fair
that firms bear the burden of the unemployment benefits
during some initial period after laying off a worker.
However, the employer cannot be held responsible for un-
employment over a long period of time as they have only
limited potential to affect the search behavior of their
former employees. Hence, experience rating in Europe can
only be rather imperfect, covering a small part of the
unemployment insurance. Indeed, recent discussions in the
Netherlands focus on the introduction of imperfect expe-
rience rating.
Conclusions
This paper discusses some recent proposals for premium
differentiation in Dutch social insurance. Competition in
disability insurance, which would give rise to premium dif-
ferentiation, turns out to be a promising instrument to en-
courage firms to combat disability and to enhance the ef-
ficiency with which disability insurance is implemented. In-
troducing premium differentiation at the firm level in
unemployment insurance would seem less attractive, in
part because unemployment risk, which is a correlated risk,
cannot be insured on the private market. Moreover, expe-
rience rating in unemployment schemes may hamper job
creation, thereby further increasing unemployment dura-
tion. This is problematic in light of the already high rate of
long-term unemployment in Europe. Furthermore, experi-
ence rating may exacerbate the adverse effects of the firing
costs associated with unemployment legislation. Moreover,
in disability insurance, premium differentiation boosts em-
ployment by reducing wages and raising effective labor
supply. In unemployment insurance, in contrast, it has the
opposite effects. Increasing differentiation of unemploy-
ment premiums on a sectoral level may reap some of the
benefits of experience rating without suffering from the
drawbacks. In any case, it is clear that other instruments
than experience rating have to be used to increase the ac-
cess of the long-term unemployed to work.
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Notes
1After having been on a sickness benefit for a year, a worker can claim a dis-
ability benefit in the Netherlands.
2However, premiums covering the first 13 weeks of unemployment benefits
are differentiated across 38 sectors. In 1998, this period was extended to 26
weeks.
3Note that the effect on the overall unemployment rate is ambiguous, as the
increase in unemployment duration is attended by a fall in the number of job
lay offs. Simulations for the US and the UK by Mortensen and Millard and
Albrecht and Vroman suggest that, on balance, the unemployment rate, which
is the product of the probability to be laid off and the duration of unemploy-
ment, is likely to drop. Also Bentolila and Bertola (1990) find that the effect on
firing is quantitatively more important than the effect on hiring.